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1. INTRODUCTION
А customs union is an agreement of two or more states to abolish customs borders 
between them and to create a territory with a common external tariff (CET). 
The commodities of each member state enter duty free into the territory of other 
members. The participating countries can exchange preferential market access by 
coordinating external tariffs to shift profits from excluded countries. 
If,  following  the  accession  to  the  customs  union,  a  country’s  exports  to  the 
member states crowds out local products or the export articles of other countries, 
the accession goes with a trade-creating or trade-diverting effect, which can 
considerably  improve  the  balance  of  payments.  However  imports  from  the 
member states also become easier and expand, and thus the outcome may be 
questionable. In any case, the burden of the consequences of trade creation and 
trade diversion is born mainly by the outsiders or by the local producers of import 
articles (see Viner, 1950).
The core concept of the Kemp-Wan theorem (Kemp and Wan, 1976) states that 
members of a customs union can choose a level of common external tariff that 
makes the member countries better off and leaves the welfare of the non-member 
countries unchanged. The essence of the result is that there is always a price at 
which the volume of imports from outside the union remains unchanged, and yet 
imports from inside the union rise. This means that aggregate welfare must rise. 
Yeh (1998) extended this theorem to the case of import quotas. Using the partial-
equilibrium approach, he showed that a customs union in the presence of import 
quotas would not leave each country worse off than before the formation of the 
customs union, whether a member of the customs union or not. . 
Ornelas  (2007)  has  shown  that  the  exporting  rents  resulting  from  this 
coordination can offset trade diversion losses produced by the union, even if its 
members are relatively small in world markets. Such gains come, however, at the 
expense of excluded countries. Small countries can also use customs unions to 
foster multilateral cooperation, by increasing the incentives of excluded countries 
to support global free trade. 
Facchini et al. (2008), who developed a political economy model of trade policy 
under imperfect competition, have pointed out that the necessity to coordinate 
tariffs in a customs union leads voters to delegate power to more protectionist 
representatives. This strategic delegation may imply that free trade areas increase 
welfare compared to customs unions.Customs Union of Belarus Kazakhstan and Russia
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Within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), formed in December 
1991, the idea of a customs union is the basis for the realisation of an agreement 
creating a common economic space. It serves to solve strictly the same task as List 
was carrying out for Germany in the 19th century when he proposed to unite 
that country. His conception was put into practice by Bismarck who became the 
father of the first German “economic miracle”. The reason for creating a customs 
union in the post-Soviet space is to solve today essentially the same problems in 
relation to Russia and its closest allies. If they open economically to the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) one by one, the result will be a division of labour 
threatening to make them an absolute periphery. If they close their economies, 
degradation will be the consequence. 
Dugin (2006) suggested that this equation could be solved by forming a customs 
union based on a specific economic philosophy. He emphasised that List had been 
a pragmatic liberal who called his theory “economic nationalism”, implying an 
implementation of liberal economics and its methods that would strengthen a 
nation, not weaken it. Therefore, the achievement of a customs union within the 
CIS demands a switch of Russia’s economic policy from the isolationism of the 
Soviet period and the subsequent ultra-liberalism and globalism to a third-way 
innovative economy. It is on the speed of this process that the transition of Russia 
and its allies to a totally new quality with a new development path depends. 
In this connection, the author’s hypothesis is that the formation of a customs 
union in the post-Soviet space can help diversify the economic structure of its 
member states and lessen their import dependence. Following some theoretical 
considerations, the evolution of the idea of customs union within the CIS is to be 
outlined. Thereafter, before the conclusion, the economic situation in its member 
states will be analysed, with a particular emphasis on their structural problems, 
economic efficiency and trade characteristics. 
2. SOME THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Formation of international organisations is induced by processes of micro and 
macro  integration.  Generally,  international  economic  integration  implies  a 
macro- and micro-level junction of several national economies, viz. a widening 
cooperation  in  production,  trade,  research  and  development  (R&D),  and 
innovations among their productive and servicing units. Macro integration is 
based on an interaction of participating states’ markets and institutions, whereas 
micro integration is an interpenetration of their corporate spheres in the form of 10
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joint ventures and producers’ associations. Integrations and economic groupings 
always  have  a  double  effect.  On  the  one  hand,  these  organisations  facilitate 
trade and economic relations among their member states, but on the other, they 
hinder trade with outsiders, with a mostly unfavourable effect on their balance of 
payments (Szentes, 1999: 348–349). 
Specialist  literature  distinguishes  the  following  forms,  or  stages,  of  macro 
integration (see Balassa, 1961): 
(1)  Preferential customs area means that countries participating in it on the basis 
of a preferential trade agreement offer each other customs and other trade 
policy preferences. These preferences can include a tariff lower than applied 
to outsiders and a mutual duty-free trade. 
(2)  In a free trade area, trade is liberalised; while towards outsiders, each country 
pursues its own customs policy. 
(3)  In a customs union, not only is trade totally liberalised, but also common 
tariffs and trade policy are applied towards non-member countries. 
(4)  The common market is more than a customs union in that, beyond ensuring 
a free internal movement of goods and services, it also liberalises capital and 
labour flows. 
(5)  In an economic and monetary union, the participants, in addition to creating 
a common market, harmonise, coordinate and standardise and, in the final 
phase, unify their national economic policies. 
(6)  Political union leads to the creation of a single state.
The theory of customs union was originally elaborated by List, who represented 
a point of view different from that of Smith and Ricardo. According to the 
latter liberal economists, if two countries mutually lift tariff barriers and totally 
liberalise their foreign trade, the consequence is the equalisation of the living 
standards in both of them. List has stated that this hypothesis is not confirmed 
by practice, showing that such lifting leads to a transfer of the hardest and 
most low-paying work to a less developed nation, with dividends gained by a 
developed one. Thus, the lifting of all tariff barriers results in a disproportionate 
development of economies – the rich grow richer and the poor poorer. But if the 
state lagging behind in development does not take part in foreign trade at all, it 
will also degrade. List proposed a third way which was not integration and not 
isolation. This was called customs union when a nation did not become totally 
open but could not remain closed. Thus, the philosophy of a customs union is 
to unite a maximal number of economies with a similar level of development, 
common  cultural  and  historic  values,  and  to  pursue  foreign  trade  jointly, Customs Union of Belarus Kazakhstan and Russia
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rationally controlling everything that goes through the borders of such a union. 
The economy, including trade and transport, is totally liberalised in the customs 
union but its borders are filtered. This involves a certain degree of globalisation, 
i.e. openness in foreign trade, which is not absolute, but relative (see List, 2009).
In  sum,  customs  union  implies  a  form  of  economic  integration  supposing 
replacement of the customs areas of member nations with a single customs area 
within whose boundaries a single customs tariff operates, along with a single foreign 
trade policy towards third countries, uniform rules of customs regulation, as well as 
a single supranational body which must regulate foreign trade, activities of definite 
production and trade spheres and decide on customs union-related matters.
3. EVOLUTION OF THE IDEA OF CUSTOMS UNION WITHIN THE CIS
The Agreement on a Customs Union (CU) of the CIS was originally signed by 
Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia in Moscow on 20 January 1995. On 10 October 
2000, these three countries together with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan concluded 
in Astana a Treaty on the Establishment of the Eurasian Economic Community 
(EURASEC)  (In  2006–2008,  Uzbekistan  was  also  a  full-fledged  participant.) 
Within  the  EURASEC,  the  envisaged  customs  union  supposed  a  decision-
making mechanism with voting shares according to the economic potential of 
each country. However, the corresponding international bodies were not formed 
(Simon Jr., 2009: 3). Thus, in practice the EURASEC member states did not get 
beyond the level of a free trade area in which 60% of customs tariffs were unified 
and some anti-dumping procedures were applied (Glinkina, 2008: 6).
In  February  2003,  the  Organisation  of  Regional  Integration  was  created  by 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine, the most developed countries of the 
Commonwealth with close economic connections both in the raw materials and 
manufacturing sectors. The founding documents of the Common Economic Space 
(CES) were signed in Yalta on 19 September 2003 and ratified by parliaments of 
the relevant countries in April-May 2004. The CES, uniting the customs areas of 
its participating states, envisaged not only a free flow of goods, services, capital 
and labour on the principles of fair competition in a common market, but also 
the introduction of a single currency, coordinated trade, fiscal, monetary and 
credit systems, and exchange rate and financial policies, with a harmonisation of 
corresponding legislation and formation of a supranational Commission on trade 
and tariffs. Within this framework, each participant was free to decide in which 
directions or measures of integration to participate and to what extent, without a 12
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right to block the progress of its partners. Decisions of fundamental importance 
would have been made considering the economic weight of participants. However, 
Kiev, having taken a course towards European integration, did not intend to 
progress beyond a free trade area and to bind itself by any far-reaching obligations 
within the CES and the whole Commonwealth. Therefore the heads of state of the 
remaining three participants – Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia – took a decision 
at the meeting of the Interstate Council (IC) of EURASEC held in Sochi on 16 
August 2006 to form, instead of the CES, the legal basis of a new customs union, 
which Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan could join as they got ready to do 
so (Andrianov, 2005: 58–59; Shumsky, 2005: 114–117; Simon Jr., 2009: 4–5). 
This issue was considered at the IC meeting in Dushanbe on 6 October 2007 
when some agreements on the subject were signed. A Commission of the Customs 
Union was set up as a single standing regulatory body, which held its first session 
in Minsk on 4 February 2009, as well as two ICs – one at the level of heads of 
state and another at the level of the heads of government of Belarus, Kazakhstan 
and Russia. At the IC meeting of presidents A. Lukashenko, N. Nazarbayev and 
D. Medvedev, held in Minsk on 27 November 2009, a package of decisions was 
signed, regulating the activities of the Customs Union of EURASEC, which was 
to become a serious step towards a higher stage of integration – a new CES. An 
agreement was reached that a full-fledged customs union was to be operable by 1 
January 2010 and all the common customs tariffs were to be harmonised before 
the 9 June tripartite meeting of heads of government in Moscow. State customs 
control was to be abolished on the Belarusian-Russian border from 1 July 2010 
and on the Russian-Kazakh border from 1 July 2011. 
At the IC meeting of EURASEC held in Saint Petersburg on 11 December 2009, 
its prime ministers were informed of progress achieved in creating the CU and 
CES within the EURASEC and of the activities of the Interstate Council of the 
Customs Union at the level of heads of government. The latter body adopted 
agreements on common trading, sanitary, veterinary and quarantine measures, 
rules and certificates, including the mutual recognition of certificating organs 
and experimental laboratories or centres; as well as protocols on changes in the 
principles, rules and control of indirect taxation and on cooperation in trade 
statistics.
Currently, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia are jointly conducting negotiations on 
accession to the WTO, planning to become members at the same time, either as 
a single customs area or separately but on mutually agreed terms. It is important 
to stress that the establishment of the EURASEC customs union and common Customs Union of Belarus Kazakhstan and Russia
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economic space will enable the whole Community to become a rapidly developing 
organisation for regional integration, able to ensure effective use of the existing 
economic potential to raise the living standard of its peoples.1
4. THE ECONOMIC SITUATION OF THE CUSTOMS UNION
The  plans  to  establish  a  customs  union  among  the  Soviet  successor  states 
are  generally  not  optimistically  evaluated  in  the  specialist  literature.  Thus, 
Michalopoulos and Tarr (1997), who analysed the economic implications for 
potential members of the Customs Union of the CIS, pointed out that such a 
union would tend to lock them into the old technology of the former Soviet 
Union, while its static effects would be more harmful to countries with relatively 
liberal trade regimes applying lower average and less differentiated tariffs than 
the CET that was then contemplated by the proposed Customs Union. Later 
on, an econometric analysis of the feasibility of the idea of a currency union 
of  Russia,  Ukraine,  Belarus  and  Kazakhstan  led  Chaplygin  et  al.  (2006)  to 
conclude that there was a lack of structural symmetry and market flexibility 
among the potential participants and would be an asymmetric pattern of shocks. 
Dugin (2006) emphasised that such opinions as a rule reflect the views of Euro-
Atlantist circles that sponsored the recent “coloured revolutions” in the CIS and 
even certain Russian liberals with close connections to Washington. It was the 
Orange Revolution in Kiev that led to Ukraine’s withdrawal from the CES. In this 
context, Dugin considers the Customs Union as the main stake in the struggle 
for predominance in the post-Soviet space on which the destiny of Russia and the 
international balance of powers depend.
Table 1. Share of Customs Union in the world GDP, trade and FDI flows
(per cent)
Year GDP
(PPP-based)
Exports
f.o.b.
Imports
c.i.f.
FDI
Inflows Outflows
1995 3.25 1.88 1.56 0.89 0.17
2000 2.97 1.91 0.95 0.30 0.26
2005 3.41 2.76 1.62 1.56 1.44
2006 3.50 3.02 1.87 2.49 1.63
2007 3.61 3.09 2.19 3.44 2.29
2008 3.71 3.64 2.47 5.13 3.03
Calculated from: International Financial Statistics Yearbook. IMF, Washington, D.C., various 
volumes; IMF, World Economic Outlook Database; UNCTAD, FDI/TNC Database.
1  See the EURASEC website, http://www.evrazes.com 14
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The CU countries possess a significant natural and economic potential. In 2005, 
their joint share in world population amounted to 2.6%, compared to 2.2% of 
Russia, 4.3% of the CIS and 7.1% of the EU-25 (Eurostat, 2008: 22–23). In the 
same year, Russia’s share in the world’s proven recoverable reserves comprised 
6.4% of crude oil and 27.1% of natural gas, with Kazakhstan’s indicators being 1.9 
and 1.7%, respectively (United Nations, 2008: 556–561). Russia was the 2nd and 
Kazakhstan the 14th largest oil exporter in the world (Najman et al., 2007: 14). 
Russia’s Gazprom, which at the turn of millennium began a powerful expansion 
in both domestic and foreign investments, gained a monopolistic position in the 
country’s gas sector (Weiner and Ludvig, 2007: 164). Nevertheless, between 1995 
and 2008, the Customs Union managed to achieve only a slight increase in its 
contribution to the world’s gross domestic product (GDP), whereas its relative 
weight in world trade expanded from 1.72 to 3.06% and in world net FDI inflows 
from 0.53 to 4.08% (see Table 1). In 2001, the CU accounted for only 0.57% of 
the world’s gross domestic expenditure on research and development (GERD), of 
which 0.55% fell to Russia (UNCTAD, 2005: 287–288). Not better is the situation 
with the use of information technologies. In 2006, the number of Internet users 
per 100 people made up 56.3 in Belarus, 18.0 in Russia and 8.1 in Kazakhstan, 
whereas in the United States it was much higher (69.5) (World Bank, 2008: 308–
310). Thus, the integration has not yet overturned the unfavourable trends related 
to an insufficient participation in the international division of labour.
In  2008,  the  real  GDP  made  up  167%  of  its  1990  level  in  Belarus,  141%  in 
Kazakhstan and 110% in Russia. In the total Customs Union, the given indicator 
reached 115%, compared to 110% on average in the Commonwealth (Table 2). The 
GDP per inhabitant in 2005 was 10,033 euros at purchasing power parity (PPP) in 
Russia, 7,358 euros in Kazakhstan and 7,225 euros in Belarus, making them the 
economically most developed countries of the CIS. This respectively comprised 
43, 32 and 31% of the average level of the EU-25 (Eurostat, 2008: 23, 45).
It should be noted that in 1991 when an economic transformation began in all of 
the CIS countries, based on predominantly neo-liberal principles, disintegration 
of previous links, emergence of customs borders, disappearance of guaranteed 
demand  on  domestic  production,  a  budget  crisis  and  inflation  became  their 
common problems. The less diversified was the economy, the stronger became 
the trade shock. Under common tasks and objectives, each state chose reform 
scenarios, priorities and sequence depending on the assessment of capabilities 
and setting out from a changing business environment. As a result, substantial 
differences emerged in legal frameworks and economic mechanisms, directions 
and means of regulating economic relations. The situation was complicated by the Customs Union of Belarus Kazakhstan and Russia
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fact that simultaneously systemic and structural changes had to be implemented, 
along with an anti-crisis macroeconomic policy. If following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union state power became weakened, including its ability to regulate the 
economy, later on it was strengthened and consolidated. Moreover, in Belarus, 
Kazakhstan and Russia economic stabilisation was accompanied by increasing 
authoritarian tendencies (Simon Jr., 2009: 17).
Table 2. Volume indices of real GDP in the CIS
(as percentage of the previous year)
Year BY KZ RU CU AM AZ GE KY MD TJ TM UA UZ CIS
1991 98.6 89.0 95.0 94.8 88.4 99.4 78.9 92.1 82.5 91.5 95.3 91.3 99.5 93.9
1992 90.4 94.7 85.5 86.4 58.2 77.4 55.1 86.2 71.0 67.7 94.7 90.1 88.9 86.2
1993 92.5 90.8 91.1 91.2 91.2 76.9 70.8 84.5 98.8 83.7 90.0 85.8 97.7 89.9
1994 88.4 87.4 87.3 87.4 105.5 80.3 89.6 79.9 69.0 78.7 82.7 77.1 94.8 85.5
1995 89.6 91.8 95.9 95.3 106.9 88.2 102.6 94.6 98.6 87.6 92.8 87.8 99.1 94.2
1996 102.8 100.5 96.4 97.0 105.9 101.3 111.2 107.1 94.1 83.3 93.3 90.0 101.7 96.3
1997 111.4 101.7 101.4 102.0 103.3 105.8 110.5 105.9 101.6 101.7 88.7 97.0 105.2 101.4
1998 108.4 98.1 94.7 95.8 107.3 110.0 103.1 102.1 93.5 105.3 106.7 98.1 104.3 97.0
1999 103.4 102.7 106.4 105.9 103.3 107.4 102.9 103.7 96.6 103.7 116.5 99.8 104.3 105.1
2000 105.8 109.8 110.0 109.7 105.9 111.1 101.8 105.4 102.1 108.3 118.6 105.9 103.8 108.9
2001 104.7 113.5 105.1 105.7 109.6 109.9 104.8 105.3 106.1 109.6 120.4 109.2 104.2 106.4
2002 105.0 109.8 104.7 105.1 113.2 110.6 105.5 100.0 107.8 110.8 115.8 105.2 104.0 105.4
2003 107.0 109.3 107.3 107.4 114.0 111.2 111.1 107.0 106.6 111.0 117.1 109.6 104.4 107.9
2004 111.4 109.6 107.2 107.7 110.5 110.2 105.9 107.0 107.4 110.3 114.7 112.1 107.7 108.4
2005 109.4 109.7 106.4 106.9 113.9 126.4 109.6 99.8 107.5 106.7 113.0 102.7 107.0 106.8
2006 110.0 110.7 106.7 107.3 113.2 134.5 109.4 103.1 104.8 107.0 111.4 107.3 107.3 107.9
2007 108.6 108.9 108.1 108.2 113.7 125.0 112.3 108.5 103.0 107.8 111.6 107.9 109.5 108.8
2008 110.0 103.3 105.6 105.7 106.8 110.8 102.1 107.6 107.2 107.9 110.5 102.1 109.0 105.7
Note. Here and below, AM = Armenia, AZ = Azerbaijan, BY = Belarus, GE = Georgia, KZ = 
Kazakhstan, KY = Kyrgyzstan, MD = Moldova, RU = Russia, TJ = Tajikistan, TM = Turkmenistan, 
UA = Ukraine, UZ = Uzbekistan, CU = Customs Union, CIS = Commonwealth of Independent 
States. Figures for the CU and CIS are author’s own calculations.
Sources: CIS STAT; IMF; EBRD; Heston et al. (2006).
During the 1990s, in the CU and other СIS countries, the common features 
of reforms were liberalisation, privatisation and a general widening of market 
relations.  Specific  measures  were  aimed  at  lessening  external  dependence  on 
raw materials, foodstuffs, military and other technologies. Price liberalisation 
revealed the inefficiency of several forms of cooperation, while the lifting of 
restrictions on foreign economic activity exposed the low competitiveness of most 
industries. By the mid-1990s the formation of market relations and development 
of private entrepreneurship had led to a shift in economic links from an interstate 16
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to  a  microeconomic  level.  The  Customs  Union  and  the  Commonwealth  as  a 
whole enhanced the independence and sovereignty of their members, as well 
as their choice of own reform models, allowing them to mitigate the negative 
consequences of the disintegration of the USSR and preserve many cooperation 
links. However, integration opportunities are substantially restrained by such 
factors as an uneven distribution of economic potential, a non-unified legal base, 
military  conflicts,  contradictions  between  national  policy  objectives  and  the 
interests of the World Bank and IMF. Although the transformational recession 
in most CIS countries is already over (see Table 1), the first generation reform 
tasks have as yet only partly been solved: economic growth has been restored (in 
a new output structure) and a quite unstable market space has formed. At the 
same time, such countries as Russia and Kazakhstan have already been tackling 
some second-generation issues, initiating pension reform and strengthening the 
competitiveness of the energy sector, railway transport and telecommunications 
(Simon Jr., 2009: 18). 
Russia, like Ukraine, Moldova and Kyrgyzstan, totally liberalised its economy, 
but for a long time failed to maintain discipline through hard budget constraints.2 
It could not contain tunnelling, i.e. the legal expropriation of income and assets 
belonging to minority shareholders, and theft through either law or administrative 
control.  Russia  encouraged  new  entry  early  in  the  transition.  However,  the 
capture of the state by a narrow set of vested interests – old enterprises and well-
connected early entrants – discouraged further entry at later stages of transition 
and created a poor investment climate. This resulted in a pattern of protection and 
selective encouragement.
Belarus, like Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, did not harden budget constraints, 
and from the very beginning strongly discouraged new entry. Access to foreign 
exchange and credit on special terms softened the budget for state enterprises. 
Reliance on mechanisms inherited from the command economy continued. The 
survival of a highly centralised structure of political power did limit the extent 
of asset stripping and other forms of theft that proved so damaging to growth in 
Russia. Yet this element of discipline came at the cost of a highly protective stance 
that discouraged entry of new enterprises, including small- and medium-sized 
ones (World Bank, 2002: 27, 34).
2  Hard budget constraints are said to exist when managers of public enterprises know the 
budgets set for them by central government are fixed and that losses will not be financed out 
of general revenues or by the central bank (World Bank, 1996: iii). Customs Union of Belarus Kazakhstan and Russia
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In this connection, Grigoryev and Salikhov (2007: 24–26) distinguish three models 
of socio-economic development of the CIS countries: (a) migratory, (b) industrial 
and (c) resource-based. 
Model (a) is characterised by migrant workers’ remittances on which no taxes 
are paid. Under the conditions of a transition economy, this model was realised 
in Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and, partly, 
Ukraine. 
Model (b) presupposes a higher foregoing level of industrialisation and attempts 
to preserve industry for the future. Within its scope, relatively stable markets 
are formed, and enterprises with former Soviet assets are preserved. This model 
makes it possible to maintain a higher competitiveness of human capital. At the 
same time, it is burdened with acute problems of property rights, tax collection 
from enterprises, formulation of a realistic industrial policy, and preservation of 
scientific and educational potential. This model is typical for Belarus, the eastern 
regions of Ukraine and Transnistria. 
Model (c) is based on the considerable incomes of the state and raw material 
branches,  creating  institutional  problems  for  the  development  of  the 
manufacturing sector and exacerbating the dependence on the volatility of world 
market prices of exported raw materials. It is present in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan 
and Turkmenistan (Azerbaijan came to it from the migratory model).
Russia in a regional aspect possesses characteristics of all three models, remaining 
an important market of goods, source of raw materials, energy carriers and 
private investments, whose economy employs a significant amount of surplus 
labour (Ibid. 27).
Table 3. Value added by economic activity
(per cent)*
Code
Agriculture
A-B 
Industry
C-E
Of which: Services
F-O
Manufacturing
D
1992 2004 1992 2004 1992 2004 1992 2004
АM 30.1 24.4 33.6 23.8 20.6 14.6 36.3 51.8
AZ 27.7 11.7 33.4 41.0  7.3  8.9 38.9 47.3
BY 23.2 10.2 41.7 33.0 39.9 31.6 35.1 56.8
GE 55.1 22.2 14.6 13.1 11.0  8.9 30.3 64.7
KZ 22.9  7.4 34.5 30.6  8.8 13.9 42.6 62.018
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KY 39.0 32.8 35.8 21.1 31.6 16.8 25.2 46.1
MD 37.5 19.9 29.8 19.4 25.3 16.5 32.7 60.7
RU  7.3  6.0 35.5 30.8 24.7 17.7 57.2 63.2
TJ 25.9 21.5 37.1 29.8 29.5 23.7 37.0 48.7
TM 18.6 19.1 57.8 40.0 40.8 28.3 23.6 40.9
UA 19.5 11.7 44.0 28.0 34.5 20.1 36.5 60.3
UZ 34.8 20.2 27.8 30.5 21.6 14.9 37.4 49.3
CIS 28.5 17.3 35.5 28.4 24.6 18.0 36.0 54.3
CU 17.8  7.9 37.2 31.5 24.5 21.1 45.0 60.6
* Gross value added including financial intermediation services indirectly measured (FISIM) at 
current prices. 
Calculated from: СIS STAT and national statistics data. 
As seen from Table 3, the share of agriculture in the production of gross value 
added in all the countries of the CIS, including the Customs Union, significantly 
contracted,  with  a  simultaneous  increase  in  the  contribution  of  the  tertiary 
sector as a consequence of the growth of the previously underdeveloped trade, 
communications and commercial services (see Table 3). In industry, the switch-
over to world market prices created favourable conditions for the growth of raw 
material branches and unfavourable ones for the development of manufacturing, 
primarily  engineering,  light  and  food  industries.  All  this  gives  evidence  of 
a  structural  convergence  making  integration  more  difficult  when  an  excessive 
development of mining and raw material branches transforms these economies 
into resource segments of the world market, depriving them of interdependence 
and inter-complementary character (Simon Jr., 2009: 15–16).
Table 4.   Macro indicators of economic efficiency in Belarus,  
Kazakhstan and Russia
(average annual change, per cent)
Indicator
1991–2008  1991–1999 2000–2008
BY KZ RU BY KZ RU BY KZ RU
Y
K
L
2.9
1.3
-0.6
1.9
2.8
-0.1
0.5
1.2
-0.3
-1.9
 1.0
-1.6
-5.0
 0.1
-3.0
-5.3
 0.6
-1.8
8.0
1.5
0.5
9.4
5.5
2.8
6.8
1.8
1.3
Y/L
Y/K
K/L
3.4
1.6
1.9
2.1
 -0.8
2.9
0.8
-0.6
1.4
-0.3
-2.9
 2.7
-2.0
-5.1
 3.2
-3.6
-5.9
 2.5
7.5
6.3
1.0
6.3
3.6
2.6
5.4
4.9
2.6
Note. Y = GDP, K = fixed assets (both at comparable prices of 2000), L = employment, Y/L = labour 
productivity, Y/K = capital productivity, K/L = capital intensity.
Calculated from: Table 3.Customs Union of Belarus Kazakhstan and Russia
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What characterises the economic efficiency of the member states of the Customs 
Union? Overall in the period 1991–2008, it was the Belarusian economy that 
showed the fastest GDP growth. Fixed assets expanded most rapidly in Kazakhstan 
where employment contracted least of all. Only there was the growth rate of fixed 
assets higher than that of GDP. In all three countries, the increase in labour 
productivity ensured the total growth of GDP, compensating for the impact of 
employment contraction. Capital productivity increased only in Belarus, while 
capital intensity was most fast growing in Kazakhstan, which primarily reflected 
the impact of its dynamic oil sector. In the sub-period of 1991–1999, it was the 
Russian economy that suffered most from the transformational recession. But even 
then in all three countries, an increase in fixed assets and, more pronouncedly, in 
capital intensity could be observed. In the sub-period of 2000–2008, the Customs 
Union’s economy totally recovered from the transformational crisis. The fastest 
rate of economic growth was achieved by Kazakhstan followed by Belarus and 
Russia. It was also the Kazakh economy where fixed assets and employment 
showed the most rapid expansion. The increase in labour productivity contributed 
to the growth of GDP by around nine-tenths in Belarus, four-fifths in Russia and 
two-thirds in Kazakhstan (Table 4). 
Many analysts turn attention to the dangers and problems connected with the 
fluctuations  of  oil  prices.  They  point  out  that  a  faster  growth,  related  to  an 
increase in oil and gas revenues, took place in Russia without the elimination 
of its structural and competitive weaknesses (Csaba, 2006: 311–312. This is also 
true for Kazakhstan). At the same time, one can positively assess the fact that 
the recent appreciation of the rouble has induced Russian enterprises to cut their 
costs and, using advanced technology, to raise competitiveness (Weiner, 2004: 5). 
For Russia, the Urals oil price, having a determining economic importance, was 
mostly unfavourable in the period from 1985 to 1998, but thereafter the situation 
radically changed. Previously it contained, but after the default it began to feed, 
economic growth, in which oil extraction played an outstanding role, with a 
record high 8.5% average annual rate of growth in 2000–2004 (Weiner, 2008: 
151–152).
As for Kazakhstan, it has an enormous demand for international capital and 
technology inflows, qualified specialists and a transparent public administration, 
capable of running a modern economy. However, numerous elements of such 
an economy are still missing. Thus, transport infrastructure is not adequately 
designed, including the pipeline system transporting energy carriers (Tarjányi, 
2008: 233).20
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Table 5. Openness of the economy
(in percentage of GDP) 
Indicator
1995 2000 2007
BY KZ RU BY KZ RU BY KZ RU
1.   Exports of goods 
and services
2.   Imports of goods 
and services
3. Openness (1+2) 
49.7
54.0
103.7
37.7
42.1
79.8
29.3
25.9
55.2
64.7
68.2
132.9
56.8
49.3
106.1
44.1
24.0
68.1
61.7
67.8
129.5
50.1
43.2
93.3
30.7
22.0
52.7
Calculated from: International Financial Statistics Yearbook. IMF, Washington, D.C., various 
volumes.
In principle, integration, including the formation of a customs union, is easier 
among open economies. As shown in Table 5, of the three countries of the CIS/
EURASEC Customs Union, the highest degree of economic openness has been 
attained by Belarus, followed by Kazakhstan and Russia. Similar was the situation 
with export orientation.
Table 6. Interstate trade within the Customs Union
Country,
group
1995 2000 2008
BY KZ RU CU* BY KZ RU CU* BY KZ RU CU*
In percentage of exports
BY
KZ
RU
 CU
–
1.6
44.4
46.0
1.0
–
44.8
45.8
3.8
3.4
–
7.2
–
–
–
33.0
–
0.3
50.6
50.9
0.2
–
17.7
17.9
5.4
2.2
–
7.6
–
–
–
25.5
–
1.1
38.2
39.3
0.3
–
12.2
12.5
3.7
3.1
–
6.8
–
–
–
19.5
In percentage of imports
BY
KZ
RU
 CU
–
1.0
56.1
57.1
2.0
–
49.9
51.9
4.2
5.9
–
10.1
–
–
–
39.7
–
0.5
64.8
65.3
0.8
–
48.3
49.1
11.1
6.5
–
17.6
–
–
–
44.0
–
0.4
59.8
60.2
0.9
–
36.4
37.3
3.9
2.5
–
6.4
–
–
–
34.6
* Average.
Calculated from: Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook and Quarterly. IMF, Washington, D.C., 
various volumes.Customs Union of Belarus Kazakhstan and Russia
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Table 7. Merchandise trade by commodity 
Section 2000 2008
BY KZ RU CU* BY KZ RU CU*
In percentage of exports
Agricultural products 10.6 8.5 7.3 8.8 8.2 4.5 5.4 6.0
Fuels and mining 
products
Of which:
Fuels
21.1
20.3
74.4
53.8
68.5
51.7
54.7
41.9
38.7
38.1
81.6
69.3
74.3
66.5
64.9
58.0
Manufactures
Of which:
Iron and steel
Chemicals
Machinery and transport 
equipment
Textiles
Clothing 
68.3
3.8
13.3
41.8
5.7
3.7
17.1
12.8
1.2
2.9
0.1
0.1
24.2
7.0
6.9
9.5
0.4
0.4
36.5
7.9
7.1
18.1
2.1
1.3
53.1
5.1
15.5
29.3
1.8
1.4
13.9
8.3
2.7
2.8
0.1
0.0
20.3
7.1
6.0
7.1
0.1
0.0
29.1
6.8
8.1
13.1
0.7
0.4
In percentage of imports
Agricultural products 14.7 10.3 20.9 15.3 9.0 8.6 11.9 9.8
Fuels and mining 
products
Of which:
Fuels
34.6
30.9
14.5
11.5
8.6
3.7
19.2
15.4
40.6
36.7
16.3
14.7
4.3
1.6
20.4
17.7
Manufactures
Of which:
Iron and steel
Chemicals
Machinery and transport 
equipment
Textiles
Clothing
50.7
6.9
12.1
28.0
3.1
0.6
75.2
7.1
10.3
56.6
0.9
0.3
70.5
3.5
11.1
46.8
3.0
6.1
65.5
5.8
11.2
43.8
2.3
2.4
50.4
7.4
9.3
31.8
1.6
0.3
75.1
11.2
8.7
54.2
0.6
0.4
83.8
3.0
9.3
62.2
1.9
7.4
69.8
7.2
9.1
49.4
1.4
2.7
* Average.
Calculated from: WTO Statistics Database. 
Although  the  USSR  itself  was  a  closed  economy,  Soviet  planners  fostered 
specialisation rather than diversification within each republic. The result was very 
little trade with the rest of the world and very large commodity flows between 
republics. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, several largely unsuccessful 
attempts have been made to restore trade among the newly independent states 22
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(NIS) and reduce adjustment costs through regional trade arrangements. Several 
“free  trade”  agreements  have  been  concluded,  but  these  were  free  in  name 
only, because most of the countries preserved export controls on key products. 
Therefore, establishing a sound interstate payment system and full convertibility 
of currencies is vital to market-based trade among the NIS. Trade barriers should 
be removed on a non-discriminatory basis, to deepen the integration of the CIS 
into the world economy (cf. World Bank, 1996: 133). 
For the three-member Customs Union’s future, it bodes ill that the not very high 
extent of its intra-trade shows a declining trend. Overall, this indicator for the 
bloc’s total turnover of goods decreased from 36.4% in 1995 to 34.8% in 2000 and 
27.1% in 2008. Hitherto, trade with CU partner countries has been much more 
important for Belarus and Kazakhstan than for Russia (see Table 6). Thus, the 
decrease in intra-trade implies that trade diversion is bigger than trade creation. 
Among the reasons, one can mention the increasing centrifugal tendencies and 
great power rivalries in the broader post-Soviet space, as well as the Eastern 
Neighbourhood Policy of the European Union, which, in the author’s opinion, is 
deliberately aimed at undermining the whole CIS (cf. Simon Jr., 2009: 20). In this 
context, finding a new form of the Commonwealth would give a serious impetus 
to the cause of the CU, which could be dynamised by a possible accession of 
Ukraine. However, Kiev has made it clear that it will consider the issue only if its 
accession does not contradict its obligations deriving from WTO membership.
Data in Table 7 confirm the predominantly resource-oriented character of the 
Kazakh and Russian economies in contrast with the more industrialised Belarusian 
one. This makes the exports of the Customs Union as a whole dominated by 
energy carriers and raw materials, whereas in imports finished goods prevail. In 
the period between 2000 and 2008, the share of fuels and mineral products in CU 
exports increased from more than a half to an almost two-thirds, whereas in the 
bloc’s imports, the relative weight of machinery and equipment expanded from 
two-fifths to nearly a half (see Table 7). Such trends do not encourage sustainable 
economic development, as raw material prices are prone to significant cyclical 
fluctuations, while manufactured imports are financed mostly from raw material 
export revenues.
In the case of Belarus, the dividends of its aspirations to reintegrate with Russia 
manifested themselves in the entry of Belarusian goods into the Russian market, 
cheap energy carrier imports and even a write-off of Belarusian gas arrears in 
1996, as well as an increasing capacity utilisation of oil refineries (Weiner, 2007: 
135). Belarus, which has a serious bargaining advantage due to its transit role, Customs Union of Belarus Kazakhstan and Russia
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is also a significant beneficiary of oil refining: it imports crude oil from Russia, 
which is processed in two big oil refineries and then exported. Until the turn 
of 2006/2007, Belarus carried out this transaction in an exceptional position, as 
Russia, because of the Customs Union, did not apply an export tariff to its crude 
oil, while Minsk did not pay anything to Moscow for the refined and re-exported 
Russian oil products. After the contracting parties were not able to agree on 
revenue sharing, Russia imposed a $180.7 export tariff on crude oil exports to 
Belarus from 1 January 2007. In response, Minsk introduced a $45 tariff for oil 
transit through Belarus to Europe during the first week of 2007. Since Russia was 
not willing to pay, Belarus tapped the transit oil. For that reason, on 8 January 
2007 Russia turned off the Druzhba (“Friendship”) oil pipeline. It is noticeable 
that Belarus had previously rejected the Russian claim to share in the latter’s 
favour the export tariff of oil products in an 85 to 15% proportion. Analysts also 
saw behind these developments attempts to weaken the Lukashenko regime, 
acquire for Russian companies the Belarusian oil refineries, increasing Minsk’s 
economic dependence on Moscow, or to force these companies to turn to other 
export channels instead of the Druzhba and thus evade the transit countries. 
Finally, according to the agreement following a three-month transportation delay, 
Belarus abolished the transit tariff, whereas Russia imposed a minor export tariff 
on the crude oil to be refined, the extent of which was $53 in 2007, corresponding 
to 29.3% of the effective export tariff for crude oil, while the total $180.7 sum was 
retained for re-export. It was separately stipulated that Russia should receive an 
increasing share in the export tariff of oil products refined in Belarus – 70% in 
2007, 80% in 2008 and 85% in 2009 (Weiner, 2008: 133, 154).
In a typically resource-based economy, natural resources account for more than 
10% of GDP or gross value added and 40% of exports (Kalyuzhnova, 2008: 7). 
Within the CU, it is the Kazakh economy that relies most heavily on mineral 
wealth, especially on crude oil and natural gas. Russia is also highly dependent 
on these resources but has a larger manufacturing industry (see Tables 3 and 
7). Russia and Kazakhstan are strategically important to world energy markets, 
attracting considerable amounts of FDI. The hydrocarbon sector of Kazakhstan 
in particular played a crucial role in the recovery from transitional recession and 
attainment of a high rate of economic growth. Both the Russian and Kazakh 
economies have a high export concentration in mineral resources, which makes 
them particularly vulnerable to price fluctuations in world commodity markets. 
This  leads  to  a  concentration  in  specific  markets,  which  again  highlights  a 
significant  dependence  on  external  factors,  the  Russian  crisis  of  1998  being 
a major example (Kalyuzhnova, 2008: 7, 10–12; Simon Jr. 2008: 3, 8–9). At the 
same time, in Kazakhstan the rise in world oil prices coincided with new oilfields 24
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coming into production and easing transport problems. Thus, the oil boom of the 
twenty-first century provides the country with a golden opportunity to overcome 
the errors and missed opportunities of the crisis decade of the 1990s (Pomfret, 
2005: 872).
Table 8. Imports in percentage of exports by main commodity groups
Commodity group
2000 2008
BY KZ RU CU* BY KZ RU CU*
Agricultural products
Fuels and mining 
products
Manufactures
62.0
52.1
115.0
143.3
885.0
39.3
81.3
1840.5
79.6
95.5
925.9
78.0
77.1
80.9
89.5
100.0
956.5
35.2
73.0
2812.2
39.0
83.4
1283.2
54.6
Total trade turnover  85.5 172.9 232.2 163.5 85.0 190.6 160.9 145.5
* Average.
Calculated from Table 7.
As seen from Table 8, since the turn of millennium, the Customs Union’s total 
trade has been closed with huge surpluses owing to the favourable trade balances 
of  Russia  and  Kazakhstan  (Belarus’  trade  deficits  were  not  able  to  alter  the 
picture). In the total CU, between 2000 and 2008 there was a nearly one and a 
half-fold increase in the trade surplus for fuels and mineral products. At the same 
time it was a negative trend that the coverage of imports by exports became even 
less insufficient for agricultural products and especially manufactures.
In Soviet economic policy, oriented chiefly towards the domestic market, there 
were two levels of import substitution – the first inside the USSR and the second 
within the Comecon. Export prices for oil and gas from the first oil shock to 
perestroika were definitely, though not always equally, favourable. A much bigger 
problem was the fact that most of the hydrocarbon exports went to the Comecon 
countries at specific internal prices. In today’s Russia, the recovery of the Putin 
era  (2000–2008)  was  based  considerably  and,  by  some  estimates,  exclusively 
on enormous and constantly increasing revenues from energy carrier exports 
(Simon Jr., 2008: 8–9). 
In Delyagin’s (2005: 75–82) and many other researchers’ opinions, the model of 
economic development based on raw material exports has already exhausted itself 
(For discussion on this question, see Köves, 2005). In this context, Kalyuzhnova 
and  Nygaard  (2008)  analysed  the  connection  between  resource  nationalism 
and financial sector intervention in Russia and Kazakhstan. They found that Customs Union of Belarus Kazakhstan and Russia
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the hydrocarbon sector boosted domestic credits through a number of direct 
and indirect routes. However, sovereign wealth funds that were established in a 
majority of energy rich emerging economies may, to the extent that they enable 
the selection of winners in specific economic sectors, create path dependency 
or exacerbate longer term allocative inefficiency arising from the governance 
structure associated with resource nationalism.
5. CONCLUSION
The idea of a customs union among the successor states of the former USSR was 
first envisaged for the entire CIS, but then narrowed to the EURASEC. Of the sub-
regional groupings in the post-Soviet space, it is currently the latter organisation 
that can be considered as most successful, though transition to a harmonised 
policy within this community, including the richest and poorest countries of the 
CIS, seems quite a long process. The Common Economic Space, because of Kiev’s 
refusal to move beyond a free trade area, has not justified the original hopes, 
remaining merely an interesting large-scale project. 
The  process  of  forming  a  customs  union  within  the  EURASEC  has  not  yet 
finished. The foregoing results have not helped diversify the economic structure 
of its member states and lessen their import dependence. Thus, the author’s 
hypothesis has not been corroborated. Moreover, it has been revealed that the 
declining level of intra-trade does not augur well for the future of this grouping, 
while the situation is further complicated by a negative impact of the present 
global crisis on the economy of its participants and increasing geopolitical rivalry 
in the region.
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